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Forecasting: Expectations, Intentions, and Confidence
Abstract
All three articles in my dissertation gather information from individuals, analyze it, and aggregate that
information into forecasts of upcoming events. The motivation is to make forecasts more efficient (accurate
and timely), more versatile (provide the most useful information for each stakeholder), and more
economically efficient (equally or more efficient and versatile for less time and/or money). The first article
looks at prediction markets and polls and concludes that prediction market-based forecasts are more efficient.
The two methods, polling versus prediction markets, vary in four key ways: sample selection (a random
sample of representative group versus a self-selected group), question type (intention versus expectation),
aggregation method (average versus weighted by money, a proxy for confidence), and incentive (not incentive
compatible versus incentive compatible). The second article isolates the second aspect of that list by
comparing the efficiency of forecasts created by polling the respondents on their expectations versus
intentions. Expectation-based forecasts are more efficient, even using non-random samples for the
expectation. Asking the expectation question to one respondent is the equivalent of asking several
respondents the intention question. Further, the expectation question helps adjust the sample to be more
representative of the target group. The third article tests a new interactive web-based interface that captures
both “best estimate” point-estimates and probability distributions from non-experts. In contrast to standard
methods of directly asking respondents to state their confidence, using my method, which induces the
respondents to reveal confidence, there is a sizable and statically significant positive relationship between
confidence and the accuracy of individual-level expectations. This positive correlation between confidence
and accuracy can be utilized to create confidence-weighted aggregated forecasts that are more efficient than
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EXPECTATIONS, INTENTIONS, AND CONFIDENCE 
David Michael Rothschild 
Advisor: Justin Wolfers  
All three articles in my dissertation gather information from individuals, analyze it, and 
aggregate that information into forecasts of upcoming events. The motivation is to make 
forecasts more efficient (accurate and timely), more versatile (provide the most useful 
information for each stakeholder), and more economically efficient (equally or more 
efficient and versatile for less time and/or money). The first article looks at prediction 
markets and polls and concludes that prediction market-based forecasts are more 
efficient. The two methods, polling versus prediction markets, vary in four key ways: 
sample selection (a random sample of representative group versus a self-selected 
group), question type (intention versus expectation), aggregation method (average 
versus weighted by money, a proxy for confidence), and incentive (not incentive 
compatible versus incentive compatible). The second article isolates the second aspect of 
that list by comparing the efficiency of forecasts created by polling the respondents on 
their expectations versus intentions. Expectation-based forecasts are more efficient, even 
using non-random samples for the expectation. Asking the expectation question to one 
respondent is the equivalent of asking several respondents the intention question. 





the target group. The third article tests a new interactive web-based interface that 
captures both ‚best estimate‛ point-estimates and probability distributions from non-
experts. In contrast to standard methods of directly asking respondents to state their 
confidence, using my method, which induces the respondents to reveal confidence, there 
is a sizable and statically significant positive relationship between confidence and the 
accuracy of individual-level expectations. This positive correlation between confidence 
and accuracy can be utilized to create confidence-weighted aggregated forecasts that are 
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Stevenson  56.0%  56.0%  58.6%  55.4%  1,135 
1956  Eisenhower beat 
Stevenson   76.4%  59.2%  60.6%  57.8%  1,161 
1960  Kennedy beat Nixon  45.0%  45.0%  48.4%  50.1%  716 





1968  Nixon beat Humphrey  71.2%  56.0%  55.5%  50.4%  844 
1972  Nixon beat McGovern  92.5%  69.7%  68.7%  61.8%  1,800 
1976  Carter beat Ford  52.6%  51.4%  50.3%  51.1%  1,320 
1980  Reagan beat Carter  46.3%  49.5%  56.5%  55.3%  870 
1984  Reagan beat Mondale  87.9%  59.8%  59.9%  59.2%  1,582 
1988  GHW Bush beat 
Dukakis  72.3%  53.1%  55.3%  53.9%  1,343 
1992  Clinton beat GHW 
Bush  65.2%  60.8%  61.5%  53.5%  1,541 
1996  Clinton beat Dole  89.6%  63.8%  60.1%  54.7%  1,274 
2000  GW Bush beat Gore  47.4%  45.7%  47.0%  49.7%  1,245 
2004  GW Bush beat Kerry  67.9%  49.2%  51.6%  51.2%  921 
2008  Obama beat McCain  65.7%  56.6%  56.5%  53.7%  1,632 

































































































1952  74.3%  58.6%  35 
1972  97.4%  100%  38 
1976  80.3%  77.6%  38 
1980  57.7%  41.0%  39 
1984  86.7%  68.3%  30 
1988  88.3%  56.7%  30 
1992  89.4%  77.3%  33 
1996  75.0%  67.5%  40 
2004  89.3%  67.9%  28 






























































































0.0 0.1 0.2 0.3 0.4 0.5 0.6 0.7 0.8 0.9 1.0
Proportion Who Intend to Vote Democratic: Vr(hat)
Root Mean Square Error = 0.151












signal, ݔ∗௥௜  of a candidate’s final vote share—where the superscript ݅ serves as a 
reminder that we are analyzing individual responses, and the asterisk reminds us that 
this is an unobserved latent variable—then: 




























0.0 0.1 0.2 0.3 0.4 0.5 0.6 0.7 0.8 0.9 1.0
Proportion Who Expect the Democrat to Win: Xr(hat)











 ݔ௥௜ ൌ ቊ 1			݂݅	ݔ
∗௥௜ ൌ ݒ௥ ൅ ߳௥௜ ൐ 0.5
0				݂݅	ݔ∗௥௜ ൌ ݒ௥ ൅ ߳௥௜ ൏ 0.5
 [2] 
Consequently the probability that an individual respondent says that they expect 





 ݔ௥௜ ൌ 1ߪఢ ሺݒ௥ െ 0.5 ൅ ߳௥
௜ ሻ [3] 
This regression yields an estimate of 1/ߪఢෞ ൌ 6.661 with a standard error allowing 














between the population parameters ݒ௥ and ݔ௥ is negligible, 30  and so it follows that: 
 ݔ௥ ൎ Φ൬ݒ௥ െ 0.5ߪఢ ൰ 
[5] 
From this, we can back out the implied expected vote share by inverting this function: 
 ܧሾݒ௥|ݔ௥ሿ ൎ 0.5 ൅ σ஫Φିଵሺݔ௥ሻ [6]  
This function is also shown as a dashed line in Figure 2, based on our estimated 
value of ߪఢෞ ൌ 0.150.  To be clear, this is the appropriate mapping only if we know the 

































































0.0 0.1 0.2 0.3 0.4 0.5 0.6 0.7 0.8 0.9 1.0
Naive Expectation-Based Forecast: 0.5+0.150*InvNormal(Xr(hat))
Based on Proportion Who Expect the Democrat to Win
Root Mean Square Error = 0.089





















































Correlation   0.571  0.757   
Encompassing regression: 























































































































 ݒ௥ෝ ൌ ݒ௥ ൅ ܾ ൅ ݁௥, where ݁௥~ܰሺ0, ߪ௘ೝଶ ሻ [7]  
Where and ܾ is a bias term which picks up the pro‐Democrat house effect in ANES polls, 
and ݁௥ is the noise term.32  In particular, notice the ݎ subscript on the variance of this 
noise term, which reflects the fact that sampling variability will vary with the 
characteristics (particularly, sample size) of a specific poll.  Assuming that ܧሾݒ௥݁௥ሿ ൌ 0 
we get the following familiar result: 
 ܧሾݒ௥|ݒ௥ෝ ሿ ൌ ߤ௩ ൅ ߪ௩
ଶ
ߪ௩ොଶ
	ሺݒ௥ෝ െ ܾ െ ߤ௩ሻ [8]  
where ߤ௩ and ߪ௩ଶ are the mean and variance of the Democratic vote share, across all the 
races in our dataset.  Forming an optimal intentions‐based forecast requires estimating 
each of these parameters.  We estimate the average vote share of Democrats directly 
from our sample: ߤ௩ෞ ൌ ଵோ ∑ݒ௥ ൌ 0.468		ሺݏ݁ ൌ 0.005ሻ, and the variance of the Democrat 
vote share is: ߪ௩ଶ෢ ൌ ଵோିଵ∑ሺݒ௥ െ ߤ௩ෞሻଶ ൌ 0.0089.  Likewise, it is easy to estimate the bias 
term, ෠ܾ ൌ ∑ሺݒ௥ෝ െ ݒ௥ሻ ܴ⁄ ൌ 0.031	ሺݏ݁ ൌ 0.008ሻ.  (This bias in the ANES is reasonably large, 
statistically significant, and to our reading, has not previously been documented; even 
when we cluster results by year, the bias remains statistically significant.)  All that 
remains is to sort out the variance of the polls, which can be broken into: ߪ௩ොଶ ൌ ߪ௩ଶ ൅ ߪ௘ଶ, 
















of error are orthogonal so that ܧሾ߬௥ሺݒ௥ െ ݒ௥ෝ െ ܾ െ ߬௥ሻሿ ൌ 0, the variance of the polling 
error can be decomposed as: 




estimate of  ߪఛଶ෢ ൌ 0.001, from Lock and Gelman (2010) (who estimate this as a function of 
time before the election; we use their fitted value for one‐month before Election Day).  
The second term reflects sampling variability, and because the poll result ݒ௥ෝ  is the mean 
of a binomial variable with mean ݒ௥ ൅ ߬௥, this second term can be expressed as: 
 ܧሾሺݒ௥ െ ߬௥ െ ܾ െ ݒ௥ෝ ሻଶሿ ൌ
ሺݒ௥ ൅ ߬௥ሻሺ1 െ ݒ௥ െ ߬௥ሻ
݊௥௘௙௙
ൎ 0.25݊௥ ߛ௥௩ൗ
 [10]  
The numerator of this expression is the product of the vote shares of the two 
parties, if the election were held on polling day.  For most elections (and particularly 






















factor”, ߛ௥௩ ൌ 1 ൅ ሺ݊௥ െ 1ሻߩ, where ߩ is the intra‐cluster correlation coefficient (Moulton, 
1990).35  In what follows, we assume that ߩ is constant across states and time.  While we 
lack the details on sampling clusters to estimate ߩ directly, we can estimate it indirectly.  
Figure 4 highlights the underlying variation, showing a consistent pattern of errors varying with 
the sample size of a poll.  Our identification comes from the fact that this pattern is shaped by 
ߩ—the higher is ߩ, the less quickly the variance of ሺݒ௥ െ ݒ௥ෝ ሻ declines with sample size.  
Thus, we return to equation [8], plug in the values for ߤ௩ෞ, ߪ௩ଶ෢ , ߪఛଶ෢  and ෠ܾ  and estimate ߩ 
directly by running non‐linear least‐squares on the following regression: 
 
ݒ௥ ൌ ߤ௩ෞ ൅ ߪ௩
ଶ෢
ߪ௩ଶ෢ ൅ ߪఛଶ෢ ൅ 1 ൅ ሺ݊௥ െ 1ሻߩ4݊௥
ሺݒ௥ෝ െ ෠ܾ െ ߤ௩ෞሻ 
[11]  
which yielded an estimate of ߩො ൌ 0.030 (with a standard error of 0.0080), which implies 











ܧሾݒ௥|ݒ௥ෝ ሿ ൌ ߤ௩ ൅ ߪ௩
ଶ
ߪ௩ଶ ൅ ߪ௘ଶ 	ሺݒ௥ෝ 	െ ܾ െ ߤ௩ሻ
ൌ 0.468 ൅ 0.0089
0.0089 ൅ 0.0001 ൅ 1 ൅ ሺ݊௥ െ 1ሻ0.0304݊௥






































0.0 0.1 0.2 0.3 0.4 0.5 0.6 0.7 0.8 0.9 1.0
Efficient Intention-Based Forecast: E[Vr|Vr(hat)]
Based on Proportion Who Intend to Vote Democratic
Root Mean Square Error = 0.076











into vote share forecasts based on ܧሾݒ௥|ݔ௥ሿ.  But taking the sample variability seriously 
means that we are trying to figure out ܧሾݒ௥|ݔ௥ෞሿ.  As an intermediate step, we begin by 
estimating the ܧሾݔ௥|ݔ௥ෞሿ.  Once again, we turn to a shrinkage estimator in order to 
generate efficient estimates of ݔ௥, given our small sample estimates, ݔ௥ෞ.  As in equation 
[8],  
 ܧሾݔ௥|ݔ௥ෞሿ ൌ ߤ௫ ൅ ߪ௫
ଶ
ߪ௫ොଶ
	ሺݔ௥ෞ െ ܾ െ ߤ௫ሻ [12]  
where ߤ௫ is the mean across all elections of the proportion of the population who expect 









∑Φቀ௩ೝି଴.ହఙചෞ ቁ ܴ⁄ ൌ 0.427	ሺݏ݁ ൌ 0.005ሻ	.  Likewise we estimate the bias term ෠ܾ ൌ























 [13]  
where, the approximation follows because the product of the population proportions 
expecting each candidate, ݔ௥ሺ1 െ ݔ௥ሻ ൎ Φቀ௩ೝି଴.ହఙചෞ ቁΦቀ
଴.ହି௩ೝ
ఙചෞ ቁ, and in turn, 
Φቀ௩ೝି଴.ହఙചෞ ቁΦቀ
଴.ହି௩ೝ
ఙചෞ ቁ ൎ 0.25  because most elections are competitive (and ߪఢෞ is not too 
small).37  As before, ݊௥௘௙௙ is the effective sample size, and ߛ௥௫ is the relevant design effect, 









transformation in equation [5], we confirm that  Φቀ௩ೝି଴.ହఙചෞ ቁ ቆ1 െ Φቀ
଴.ହି௩ೝ














ߪ௫ଶ෢ ൅ 1 ൅ ሺ݊௥ െ 1ሻߩ௫4݊௥















0.040 ൅ 1 ൅ ሺ݊௥ െ 1ሻ0.0454݊௥






















































0.0 0.1 0.2 0.3 0.4 0.5 0.6 0.7 0.8 0.9 1.0
Efficient Expectation-Based Forecast: E[Vr|Xr(hat)]
Based on Proportion Who Expect the Democrat to Win
Root Mean Square Error = 0.060









































Correlation   0.593  0.768   
Encompassing regression: 






























 ܲݎ݋ܾሺݒ௥ ൐ 0.5ሻ ൌ Φቆܧ
ሾݒ௥ሿ െ 0.5
ߪఌ,ாሾ௩ೝሿ




















ݒ௥ ൌ ߤ௩ෞ ൅ ఙೡ
మ෢
ఙೡమ෢ାఙഓమ෢ାభశሺ೙ೝషభሻഐర೙ೝ
	ሺݒ௥ෝ െ ෠ܾ െ ߤ௩ෞሻ and we think of the ሺݒ௥ෝ െ ෠ܾ െ ߤ௩ෞሻ as the raw data  
ܺ௥, where ߤ௫ is the average raw data.  Thus, the variance of the forecasts: 
 ߪఌ,ாሾ௩ೝሿଶ෣ ൌ ܴܯܵܧଶ ൅
ܴܯܵܧଶ
ߪ௣௢௟௟ଶ ൫݌݋݈݈ െ ߤ௣௢௟௟൯
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Sample Size: Nr
Error from Expecation-Based Forecast











IV, the forecasts of vote share from the expectation data is more accurate.  ோெௌாమఙ೛೚೗೗మ ൌ
ߪௌ௛௥௜௡௞௔௚௘ଶ  is 0.177 for intention and 0.186 for expectation.  On average, about half of the 
ߪఌ,ாሾ௩ೝሿ comes from the each side of the equation and the estimated standard deviation 
does decrease with sample size.  Putting together equation [15] and [16]: 




ۇ ܧሾݒ௥ሿ െ 0.5
ඨܴܯܵܧଶ ൅ܴܯܵܧ
ଶ















































Encompassing regression: ࡵሺࡰࢋ࢓ࢃ࢏࢔ሻ࢘ ൌ 


































































Correlation   61.6%  69.2%   
Encompassing regression: 











Probabilistic Forecasts:  ࡼ࢘࢕࢈ ሺ࢜࢘ ൐ ૙. ૞|࢜࢘ෞሻ 
ࡼ࢘࢕࢈ 













Encompassing regression: ࡵሺࡰࢋ࢓ࢃ࢏࢔ሻ࢘ ൌ 





Optimal weights: 																	ࡵሺࡰࢋ࢓ࢃ࢏࢔ሻ࢘ ൌ 













measures in the first two columns.  In the encompassing regression, the constant ߙො ൌ 0.032 









We start by revisiting equation [12] from Section IV: ܧሾݔ௥|ݔ௥ෞሿ ൌ ߤ௫ ൅ ఙഥೣ
మ
ఙෝೣమ
	ሺݔ௥ෞ െ ܾ െ



















combining equations [13] and [14], is ߪ௫ଶ෢ ൅ ሺଵାሺ௡ೝିଵሻఘೣ	ሻସ௡ೝ  .  We are going to have to re‐
derive    for these two biased samples, as the clustering is going to have a totally 









































































Correlation   0.592  0.664  0.604  0.718 
Encompassing regression: 





























































































the constant ߙො ൌ െ0.009 (se=0.093).  In the encompassing regression with the Republican sample, 



























Expect Intent # Obs # Elections Expect Intent # Obs # Elections Expect Intent # Obs # Elections
President 89.4% 80.7% 161 19 69.2% 61.5% 39 12 59.6% 57.7% 52 11
1936 Electoral 
College
72.3% 80.9% 47 47 ‐ ‐ 0 0 ‐ ‐ 0 0
Governor 78.9% 78.9% 19 9 83.3% 50.0% 6 6 100.0% 100.0% 2 1
Senator 81.8% 90.9% 11 7 ‐ ‐ 0 0 ‐ ‐ 0 0
Mayor 100.0% 100.0% 4 2 100.0% 66.7% 3 1 ‐ ‐ 0 0
Other 80.0% 80.0% 10 9 100.0% 66.7% 3 2 50.0% 50.0% 2 2
USA Total 84.9% 81.3% 252 93 74.5% 60.8% 51 21 60.7% 58.9% 56 14
AUS (Parliament) 88.9% 41.7% 36 3 66.7% 33.3% 21 3 24.4% 66.3% 86 2
GBR (Parliament) 85.0% 90.0% 20 9 100.0% 92.3% 13 7 69.4% 62.9% 62 9
FRA (President) 60.9% 56.5% 23 4 40.0% 20.0% 5 3 ‐ ‐ 0 0
Other 71.4% 71.4% 7 6 0.0% 0.0% 1 1 0.0% 0.0% 1 1
non‐USA Total 79.1% 59.3% 86 22 72.5% 50.0% 40 14 43.0% 64.4% 149 12
Total 83.4% 75.7% 338 115 73.6% 56.0% 91 35 47.8% 62.9% 205 26











as well as those of ݉ െ 1 of her friends, family, and coworkers, effectively creating a 
survey of ݉ likely voters.  We denote the proportion of person ݅’s sample who plan to 
vote for the Democrat as ݒ௥ప෡ .  If each person’s individual “informal poll” is drawn from 




ܲݎ݋ܾ൫ݒ௥ప෡ ൐ 0.5൯ ൌ Φ
ۉ
ۇ ݒ௥ െ 0.5
ටݒ௥ሺ1 െ ݒ௥ሻ݉ ی
ۊ ൎ Φቀ2√݉ሺݒ௥ െ 0.5ሻቁ 
[18]
where Φሺ. ሻ is the standard normal cdf.  The approximation equality follows because in 
competitive elections 1/ඥݒ௥ሺ1 െ ݒ௥ሻ ൎ 2.  
Thus, equation [15] suggests that in a simple probit regression of whether an 
individual forecasts the Democrat to win, the coefficient on the winning (or negative 

















identical to that described in equation [4], which we used to estimate ߪ௘ෞ.  Comparing 
these equations we see that 2√݉ ൌ ଵఙച, or ݉ ൌ
ଵ
ସఙചమ.  Thus given our estimate of ߪఢෞ ൌ




































1  1  1  19.0% 
1  0  1  15.8% 
1  1  0  3.4% 
1  0  0  12.3% 
0  1  1  7.5% 
0  0  1  5.8% 
0  1  0  6.5% 










































































0.3 0.4 0.5 0.6 0.7
Actual Democrat Vote Share
Intend to vote Democrat Intend to vote Republican
Model inference for Democrats Model inference for Republicans
Local linear regression estimates, using Epanechnikov kernal and rule-of-thumb bandwidth.
Shaded area shows 95% confidence interval.
Proportion expecting the Democrat to win






































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































Category  Uncertainty  Disagreement Uncertainty  Disagreement 
Calories  0.221  0.373  0.175/0.183  0.392 
Concert Tickets  0.222  0.384  ‐  ‐ 
Gas Prices  0.026  0.015  0.027/0.026  0.027 
Movie Receipts  0.314  0.549  ‐  ‐ 













































































     ࡾࢇ࢔࢑ሺࡱ࢘࢘࢕࢘ሻ ൌ
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     ࡾࢇ࢔࢑ሺࡱ࢘࢘࢕࢘ሻ ൌ



















































































ࡰ࢏࢙࢚ࢂࢇ࢘ in regression: Mean  Median  Mode  Point‐
Estimate 
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Calories  0.585  0.884  0.884 
Concert Tickets  0.880  0.873  0.882 
Gas Prices  0.308  0.347  0.362 
Movie Receipts  0.131  0.129  0.534 
Unemployment  0.985  0.987  0.988 
Note: The confidence‐weighted forecast is optimized by category as in the lower half of Table 5. 
The table is nearly identical regardless of which efficient weighting scheme I utilize. 
Two categories of questions have follow‐up questions that can be used to better 
calibrate individual‐level responses. First, for the calorie question, I ask “How closely do 
you follow calories?” with options that run from “not very closely” to “regularly, and I 
know the item in the question.” There is no correlation between self‐reported 
information and the rank of absolute error within the question.52 This conforms to results 
of Table 5, where similar to stated information, stated confidence levels on a four point 
scale fails to gain significance in its correlation with accuracy. Second, for the movie 
                                                     
52 Study I is slightly negative and insignificant and the non‐treated Study II is slightly positive 
and insignificant. Together the coefficient from OLS of intent on rank of error is 0.001 (0.022). 
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question, I ask “Are you interested in seeing ‘MOVIE’?” with options that run from 
“Definitely not going to watch it” to “Have already been excited about it/Definitely 
watch it in a theater.” Thus, this question is combining two dimensions: information and 
partiality. There is a positive and statistically significant correlation between 
information/intent and the point‐estimate; if a respondent likes a movie, she projects it 
to earn more money. A fixed‐effect regression of information/intent (which runs from 1 
to 5) on the point‐estimate yields a coefficient of 19.47 (5.33) for information/intent (i.e., 
respondents estimate the movie to earn $19.5 million more for each degree of intent to 
see the movie). With repeated data, I would be able to inflate or deflate responses to 
debias them for the information and partiality of the respondents. 
IV.	Discussion	
There are several reasons why a graphical, interactive interface can collect 
information that is difficult to attain in standard telephone or in‐person settings. First, 
information can be revealed, rather than stated, which makes it much harder for the 
respondents to manipulate the answer to fulfill incentives other than their best estimate. 
Second, the interface makes the confidence revelation part of the main question, whereas 
asking a respondent to state confidence after they supply the main point‐estimate, may 
not seem as serious to the respondent or operate under different incentives. Third, 
Ariely, et al (2003) shows that people can incorporate new information into their 
understanding of the world; the problem is that they sometimes appear arbitrary, 
because they are not sure where with what baseline they should start. A graphical 
interface can provide some subtle baselines for the respondent without providing too 
much anchoring. For example, in this article, the question regarding calories of fast food 
includes pictures and descriptions of a few different foods. Similarly, the presentation of 
the questions themselves are providing subtle information about point‐estimates and 
probability distributions that teach people how to provide information they have, but do 
not know how to elucidate. 
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Polls and predication markets are just two methods for gathering individual‐
level information and aggregating it into forecasts; both methods have benefits and 
negatives, and my method is one attempt to harness the better aspects of both of them. 
One of the key problems with polls is the reluctance of researchers to ask the question 
they are trying to answer, which is usually the question that gathers the most relevant 
information from the respondent. The graphical and interactive nature of this method 
allows me to ask questions that do not gather consistent and meaningful responses in a 
telephone or in‐person format. Polls’ transparent aggregation does not take advantage of 
disparities in information of the respondent and prediction markets’ more opaque 
aggregation does not record massive amounts of information and is susceptible to 
manipulation.53 With my method I can capture all of the information and aggregate it, 
transparently, with confidence. Further, I can create not only accurate forecasts of the 
level of the outcome, but also, I can explore full probability distributions on both the 
individual and aggregate level. 
The full method proves itself meaningful in absolute terms and trumps simpler 
confidence ranges in information, but it does take up more time, which can be important 
in polling. The mean (median) length of time from start to finish for the five questions 
with the full method is 13.1 (12.0) minutes, while the confidence range variation is 7.6 
(6.7) minutes. Further, the confidence range responses provide a statistically significant 
positive correlation between confidence and accuracy that can be utilized for the 
creation of certainty‐weighted forecasts. The goal of this article is to provide validation 
of my method versus the best and most practical of the other possible options on 
information and utility, but if time/cost is an issue, there will definitely be scenarios 
where the confidence range is the right option. 
                                                     
53 There is evidence that the national popular vote prediction markets may suffer from 
manipulation by people motivated to gain publicity for their chosen candidate. The aggregation 
is over willingness to invest money, not confidence! 
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Turning to decision making, there is consensus in the literature on the 
importance of expectations in decision making. Manski (2004) demonstrates that playing 
a simple economic game, a subject with one of three different expectations and one of 
two different utility functions will make the same move (i.e., revealed behavior) in four 
out of six possible scenarios. He outlines many empirical examples of subjects having 
faulty expectations, but emphasizes the gap in the literature in understanding 
expectations separated from utility. 
The follow‐up question for the gas question hints at the usefulness of my method 
in decoupling expectation from utility in revealed decisions. The main question asks the 
respondent to imagine that she is driving down a major highway and she notes the price 
of gas at last few consecutive stations. She is running low and can hold out only long 
enough to stop at one of the next three stations; she is asked to create a probability 
distribution of the lowest price of gas among these next three stations. The follow‐up 
question asks what price would induce the driver to stop at the first station she sees, 
rather than keep going and try one of the following two stations. The median response 
was at the 30% point of the probability distribution of what they expect the lowest price 
of the next three gas stations to be. That means that the median driver would stop where 
they believe that there is only a 30% chance that one of the next two stations would be 
less. Just 6% of respondents said they would stop at station in the 80% percentile or 
higher. Most importantly, there is a statistically significant positive correlation between 
the point‐estimate expectation and price in which the driver would stop for gas. Thus, 
the higher the driver expects the lowest price to be, the higher price the driver will stop 
and pay. Further, confidence demonstrates a meaningful role in the decision making; if 
two drivers have the same point‐estimate, the driver with the larger standard deviation 
(i.e., less confidence) will stop at a gas station with a higher price. Expectation matters, 
but so does confidence! 
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Study I & II (Gas Prices): What is your best estimate for the LOWEST price of gas 
among the next 3 stations on the highway described in the below table? The below table 
shows the price of gas at the 3 previous gas stations and the question assumes that you 
continue down the same highway. All prices are from 8/4/2010 on a major Eastern 
highway. (9/16/2010 for the Study II.) 
Gas Prices Follow‐up Question: If you had about enough gas where you felt comfortable 
driving for up to 3 more stations, what price of gas would induce you to stop at the next 
station? 
Study I Only (Movie Receipts): What is your best estimate for the 4 week gross for 
MOVIE in millions of dollars (i.e. what will MOVIE gross domestically through its 4th 
weekend of wide release)? DESCRIPTION OF MOVIE. Nationwide release on DATE OF 
RELEASE. The below table shows the domestic gross for the last 30 wide‐release movies 
through their 4th weekend of release. 
Movie Receipts Follow‐up Question: Are you interested in seeing MOVIE? 
Study I & II (Unemployment Rate): What is your best estimate for the 
August/September Unemployment Rate in the state noted below (use the slider below to 
show your answer)? The below table shows the Unemployment Rate in a randomly 
chosen state in a few relevant periods. Unemployment rates are adjusted for seasonal 
trends. 
Unemployment Rate Follow‐up Question: How familiar are you with the state in the 
question? 
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